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STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration  
[REDACTED]  
FROM : [REDACTED] W. M. Jarvey  
A Director of Personnel  
SUBJECT : Review and Comments as Pertinent on the Summary  
of Recommendations Contained in the Senate  
Select Committee's Final Report - Book I  
REFERENCE : Memo from Assoc. LC dtd 4 Jun 76, subj: Senate  
Select Committee Recommendations

We have reviewed OLC's summary of the 87 recommendations contained in the Senate Select Committee's Final Report - Book I and have comments on the following:

1. Recommendation #31 - Improve DDI personnel system.

Comment: Yes. The actual text of this recommendation addresses two specific aspects of the DDI personnel system: (a) "that CIA and the Intelligence Oversight Committee(s) of Congress should reexamine the personnel system of the Directorate of Intelligence with a view to providing a more flexible, less hierarchical personnel system," and (b) "supergrade positions should be available on the basis of an individual's analytical capabilities."

In reference to (a) above: In the narrative leading to this part of the recommendation, the Committee's report cites what the Committee construes as "problems" flowing from certain DDI career and personnel management policies and practices such as recruitment of DDI analysts at entry levels for career employment in the DDI; career pattern rewards for most analysts by promotion to supervisory positions; too much organizational "layering" and successive levels of review, and little lateral entry of established analysts and intelligence experts into CIA (i.e., DDI) ranks. Under the Agency's decentralized personnel management system, primary responsibility for addressing this recommendation rests with the Deputy Director for

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Intelligence. The Office of Personnel could participate and assist the DDI in reorganizational efforts and provide guidance and assistance in the development of efforts to improve career and personnel management within the Career Service.

In reference to (b) above: As regards the recommendation of the Committee's Report relative to providing supergrade positions within the DDI on the basis of the individual's analytical capabilities, we conclude that the Committee is recommending extension of the "dual track" career progression for substantive officers (i.e., non-supervisory/managerial) into the supergrade range. Up to the present time, the evaluation criteria applied by the Office of Personnel in allocating non-supervisory positions in DDI components have related to establishing positions in the grade GS-09 through GS-15 level. The primary factors for evaluating such positions are:

- a. Nature, scope and complexity of assigned projects,
- b. Level of responsibility, and
- c. Extent to which the incumbent is recognized as an authority in a substantive field, either within the Agency or the Intelligence Community.

Establishment of positions at the grade GS-16, 17 and 18 levels would be determined by position audit by the Office of Personnel and substantiation that the evaluation of the various classification factors justified adjudication at the supergrade level. Supergrade ceiling allowances would have to be made available to accommodate their incumbents.

2. Recommendation #32 - DDI should bring in more established analysts.

Comment: Yes. The impact on the Office of Personnel will depend upon the DDI response to this recommendation. If staffing requirements are changed to emphasize the need for "more established analysts," the OP recruitment effort can be readily directed to this type of applicant.

3. Recommendation #34 - Continue to broaden experience of analysts by rotation.

Comment: Yes. Again the impact on OP will depend on the DDI response to this recommendation. We believe, however, the political aspects of rotation, both within Government and in the academic or

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business community may make such arrangements extremely difficult. Rotation within Government or with the academic or business community is probably easier recommended than achieved. It's a two-way arrangement and there is a real possibility of deep reluctance at this point in time to either take on a CIA employee or to permit such an association by one's own employees. It undoubtedly is an objective worthy of pursuit, however, and if the goal is not too massive can probably be attained on a limited scale.

4. Recommendation #56 - CIA employees should be required to report abuses.

Comment: Yes. This confirms the Agency's present position. There has been an Employee Bulletin issued on this subject and a recent DCI memorandum requiring that a paragraph<sup>70</sup> of this effect be included in all employee Letters of Instruction.

5. Recommendation #57 - DCI should be required to report employee violations to the AG.

Comment: Neither. The actual text of this recommendation would require the DCI "to report any information regarding employee violations of law related to their duties and the results of any internal Agency investigation to the Attorney General." The reference to reporting the results of any internal Agency investigation is ambiguous and should be reworded . . . "and the results of any internal Agency investigation pertaining to an alleged violation of Title 18 to the Attorney General." ✓ This rewording would distinguish between questions about propriety, as opposed to legality, within Agency channels and would have the effect of facilitating such questioning. A larger question which must be raised is the possible inhibiting effect of these recommendations upon the individual employee's willingness to try innovative approaches in furtherance of the Agency's missions.

6. Recommendation #59 - CIA should periodically require employees to report abuses.

Comment: Yes. Current Agency policy and procedures cover this recommendation. In addition, we propose that coverage of this requirement be included in HIB  Handbook of Required Regulatory Readings, which is required reading for all employees on an annual basis.

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7. Recommendation #65 - Continue to strengthen IC and OGC.

Comment: Yes. Action has already been taken to implement this recommendation through reorganization and expansion of these Staffs. The text of the Committee's Report includes a footnote to this

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recommendation proposing that efforts be made to rotate officers of the OGC to other Governmental positions. This aspect of the recommendation should be addressed by the General Counsel.

8. Recommendation #66 - IG and OGC should have rank equal to DD/CIA.

Comment: Yes. This recommendation has been implemented.

9. Recommendation #79 - GAO should audit at request of oversight committees.

Comment: GAO audit of the Agency to be expected to focus on Agency management policies and practices, particularly personnel management. The Agency must be prepared to fully explain and substantiate the several Agency personnel policies and practices (such as PRA's, underslotting, flexible T/O's, etc.) which are different from the regular Civil Service practices. As recent legislation in 1974 gave the GAO responsibility for program evaluation, it must be assumed that any GAO management audit of the Agency would incorporate program evaluation and/or review of internal program evaluation systems. Accordingly, the Office of Personnel and any other office conducting program evaluations must bear in mind GAO standards and guidelines.

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F. W. M. Janney

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